In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can affect successive markets, when uncertainty can jointly influence both the upstream and downstream markets' conditions. The main result of the paper is that the equilibrium input and output quantities under stochastic dependence can be higher or lower than the corresponding quantities in the case of certainty equivalence depending on how much dependent are the events.
Introduction
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a¤ect successive markets, when uncertainty can jointly in ‡uence both the upstream and downstream markets' conditions. Generally, shocks a¤ecting the economic environment in ‡uence simultaneously most markets in the same chain of value, and not each of them separately. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, most existing studies in microeconomics, consider that uncertainty a¤ects just one market in isolation (Sandmo 1971 , Leland 1972 , Sheshinski and Dreze 1976 , Gabszewicz and Poddar 1997 , Maskin 1999 , Grimm and Zoettl 2006 , excluding thereby that the spillovers resulting from uncertainty might be transferred from market to market in the same chain 1 . These spillovers follow from the technological linkage between …rms producing the input and those using this input in their own production process.
An example of the chain e¤ects which can occur when uncertainty a¤ects more than one market is provided by a consumption product the demand of which would be high, whatever the price, when the weather is good and low in the opposite case. Moreover, assume that simultaneously, the resource needed to produce that good would be scarce if weather is bad, and abundant in the opposite case. Then good weather simultaneously leads to high output demand function and abundant resources so that restricting the analysis to the downstream market only, does not take into account the e¤ect of weather on the upstream market.
We analyse uncertainty in successive markets using a microeconomic set up. To this end, we …rst introduce a simple model to describe how a downstream …rm and an upstream …rm interact in a deterministic environment. Then, we introduce uncertainty on output demand function in the downstream market and, as a consequence, on the demand function for input in the upstream market. Furthermore, we assume that the cost function for producing the input is also uncertain. We consider two cases: stochastic independence and stochastic dependence.
We …nd that if shocks a¤ecting di¤erent markets are dependent, the equilibrium quantity in both downstream and upstream markets under stochastic dependence, is higher or smaller than the equilibrium quantity under certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence) according to the degree of stochastic dependence between the two random variables, namely output demand function and input cost function.
The e¤ect of uncertainty on output demand has been extensively questioned in the existing literature. It is shown in a number of papers (e.g. Sandmo, 1971 , Leland, 1972 ) that …rm's attitude to bear the inherent risk of production has important e¤ects on the …rm's willingness to produce, i.e. on its choice of optimal level of production. Uncertainty places a crucial role on the pro…tability of entry of new …rms in a market and on how much capacity to build to deter entry by the incumbent …rms Poddar, 1997, Maskin, 1999) . Sheshinski and Dreze (1976) analyse uncertainty on output demand in a single commodity competitive market and zero price elasticity demand. These authors …nd that free entry and competition may lead to excess capacity on the average and that the price is lower than the minimum average cost.
The model
Consider a monopoly …rm who faces an uncertain output demand function p(q); twice di¤erentiable with p 0 (q) < 0 and p 00 (q) < 0, which is
with probability p (q) with probability 1 with denoting the probability of getting a high demand function. We assume that p + (q) = p(q) + ; while p (q) = p(q) ; > 0; p(q) 0; 8q: Thus, the output demand function p(q) is a random variable with two values. The downstream monopoly uses the input z to produce the output using a linear technology f (z) = z, > 0. This input z is produced by a monopoly upstream …rm in the upstream market with cost function c(z); with c 0 (z) > 0; c"(z) < 0; given by c(z) = c + (z) with probability c (z) with probability 1 :
where, for 8z; c + (z) > c (z):Thus, the input cost function c(z) is a random variable with two values. Further, we use the simplifying assumption :
It follows that the set of possible states of nature reduces to four elements, namely: a-both the output demand function and the cost function of producing input are high; b-the output demand function is high and the cost function of producing input is low; c-the output demand function is low and the cost function of producing input is high;
d -both the output demand function and the cost function of producing input are low.
Certainty equivalent
In the certainty equivalent scenario, output demand is deterministic and equal to its actuarial value, namely p
( 1 2 ) : Similarly, the cost function of the upstream monopolist is deterministic and equal to its actuarial value, namely c + (z)+(1 )c (z): Denote by r the input price: Thus, the pro…t of the downstream monopolist in this case is equal to (r; q) = (p(q)
( 1 2 )) q r q;
The …rst order condition of the downstream monopolist writes as:
Taking into account the linearity of the production function, (2) can be reexpressed as the input demand r(z); namely
The pro…t (z) of the upstream …rm writes as
Consequently, using the …rst order condition for pro…t maximization,
we implicitly obtain the input supply function s(z): Applying the input market clearing condition, we get r(z ) = s(z ); where z is the equilibrium input quantity. Accordingly, the pro…t of the upstream monopolist writes as
Using the simplifying assumption c
; the …rst order condition for pro…t maximization writes as
while the second order condition obtains as
Since c"(z) < 0; the pro…t of the upstream monopolist is concave if the demand for input faced by this …rm is concave. Furthermore, concavity of input demand obtains from the following condition on output demand :
Consequently, when (4) holds, the solution given by the FOC exists and is interior. It is shown in the appendix that condition (4) is satis…ed in the example p(q) = 1 + q 3 with probability and 1 q 3 with probability 1 :
Uncertainty
Assume now that both the downstream and the upstream …rms know the distribution probability on output demand. Furthermore assume that the downstream …rm behaves as a price taker in the input market. In other words, we assume that the upstream …rm is aware of the e¤ect of uncertainty on output demand, while the downstream …rm ignores the e¤ect of this uncertainty on the input price 2 . Finally, the upstream …rm is assumed to know the probability distribution of its own production cost function.
We consider now the consequences of this uncertain environment on the market solution in two di¤erent scenarios: stochastic independent, and stochastic dependent, events.
Stochastic independence
Under stochastic independence, the states of nature a, b, c and d occur with probability ; (1 ); (1 ) ; (1 )(1 ); respectively: The expected pro…ts of the downstream monopolist now obtain as
which can be rewritten as
Comparing the objective functions (1) and (5), we see that the output quantities maximizing pro…ts of the downstream monopolist coincide in both cases.
Since the objective function of the downstream monopolist under stochastic independence is the same as in the case of certainty equivalent, the input demand is also the same in both cases. Therefore, the objective function for the upstream monopoly under stochastic independence is also the same as in the certainty equivalence scenario. Hence, the market solution under independent stochastic uncertainty coincides with the market solution which appears in the case of certainty equivalence.
Stochastic dependence
Consider now the case of stochastic dependence. We keep the assumption that the downstream …rm does not know the e¤ect of uncertainty on the input price and, accordingly, takes the input price as given whatever the state. Furthermore, for sake of simplicity, we assume that Pr(high output demand p low input marginal cost ) = Pr(low output demand p high input marginal cost ) = : Hence the states of nature a, b, c and d now occur each with probabilities a : Pr (high output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = (1 ); b : Pr (low output demand \ low input marginal cost ) = (1 ) (1 ); c : Pr (low output demand \ high input marginal cost ) = ; d : Pr (high output demand \ high input marginal cost) = (1 ) :
Then, the expected pro…t function of the downstream …rm writes as
De…ne as the probability to have a high output demand function under stochastic dependence, namely = (1 2 ) + ; with 0 (1 2 ) + 1; or
: Then the expected pro…t obtains as
Since the objective function (5) is the same as (6), except that the probability of high demand is now given by and the probability of low demand is 1 ; the input demand is similar to the input demand under stochastic independence with these corresponding probabilities. Hence, following the same procedure as in the case of certainty equivalent case, we obtain the market solution from the …rst order condition of (5) :
Thus, we …nally obtain Proposition 1 The output and input quantities produced at equilibrium under stochastic dependence are respectively higher equal or lower than the quantities produced under certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence), if and only if the probability of a high output demand function, under certainty equivalence, is higher, equal or lower, than the corresponding probability under stochastic dependence.
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Notice that
Thus, the probability of having a high output demand function (resp. output quantity) increases with the probability of high input cost function (resp. input quantity), when the probability of high output demand conditional on low input marginal cost does not exceed 1 2 . As for the prices, notice that both the output and input prices under stochastic dependence can be either higher equal or lower than the price under certainty equivalence (or stochastic independence). Of course, if is higher than ; then the demand functions both in the downstream and upstream markets shift upwards. However, the intersection with the quantity chosen by the monopolist in its own market does not allow to conclude about the sign of the change in the corresponding price.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how uncertainty can a¤ect successive markets when uncertainty can jointly in ‡uence both the upstream and downstream markets' conditions. Our main interest is to analyse the e¤ect of uncertainty on the production choice of the upstream and the downstream …rm, when uncertainty in each market originates from stochastic independent and/or dependent events. The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is twofold. First, it provides a microeconomic framework to deal with uncertainty when it a¤ects di¤erent markets belonging to the same chain of value. On the other hand, it analyses how these combined sources of uncertainty can a¤ect the production choices of a downstream and upstream …rm in a bilateral monopoly situation. A natural extension of the present paper would be to analyse successive oligopolies and, as a byproduct, how uncertainty can in ‡uence the pro…tability of vertical integration and horizontal mergers.
Appendix
Condition (4) is satis…ed in the example p(q) = 1 + q 3 with probability and 1 q 3 with probability 1 . Consider a downstream monopolist facing this random demand function and that its technology is de…ned by f (z) = z: Maximizing the pro…t (q) in the certainty equivalent case, (q) = ( (1 q 3 + ) + (1 )(1 q 3 ))q rq ; we obtain q(r) = z(r) = (2 1) + (1 r)): The upstream monopolist faces the above input demand and assume that he faces,a linear stochastic production cost c(z), equal to + z with probability and z with probability 1 : Taking into account the equality of demand and supply, i.e. r(z) = s(z), in the upstream market, we get r(z) = (2 1) 4z 3 +1. Accordingly, the pro…t function of the upstream monopolist writes as (z) = 2 4z 3 + 1 z z; with = + + (1 ) : It is easily checked that condition (4) holds. Taking the FOC leads to z = :
